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INTRODUCTION
his article is about a fairly discrete issue of topical im-
portance demanding immediate attention, but is also
about a much more open-ended problem that will likely take
many years to resolve. The discrete issue is: What is the appro-
priate way to handle so-called “location savings” under arm’s
length transfer pricing? Specifically, when an affiliate realizes
cost savings specific to its local market, to what extent should its
compensation under an arm’s length standard reflect such sav-
ings? Should the affiliate earn some premium to reflect the cost
savings it is contributing to the overall enterprise? The longer-
range problem relates to how international double taxation con-
ventions will have to evolve in order to deal with the pressures
of globalization, particularly regarding both the right and ability
of countries to impose source-based tax. Double taxation conven-
tions will likely have to evolve to also deal with pressures on
residence-based taxation, as reflected, for example, in the fluid-
ity of corporate residence. But, this specific issue is beyond the
scope of this article.
In isolation, these issues have been widely discussed. The
problem of location savings has recently been addressed by the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) under Base Erosion and Profit Sharing (BEPS) action
item 8.1 Discussions of the pressures of globalization and the in-
ternational community’s increasingly outmoded body of interna-
tional tax rules—including those embodied in the double taxa-
tion conventions and the essential source-residency dichotomy
on which the treaties are premised—are fairly ubiquitous. This
article, however, is innovative in its attempt to connect these two
issues. To see the nature of the connection, and at the risk of
simplification, this article would broadly like to suggest that the
combined forces of globalization and technological innovation
have presented at least three sorts of pressures on the interna-
tional tax system and the basic source-residence paradigm.
The first pressure involves the problem of intangibles. As has
been oft noted, more and more economic value over time has
1. See ORG. FOR ECON, CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], GUIDANCE ON
TRANSFER PRICING ASPECTS OF INTANGIBLES, ACTION 8: DELIVERABLE 12–14
(2014) [hereinafter ACTION 8 DELIVERABLE] (adding paras. 1.80–1.84 to the
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines).
T
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come to be reflected in intangible assets.2 This presents grave
problems for the historic approach to international taxation,
which depends crucially in part on the ability to demarcate in-
come properly taxable on a source or territorial theory. Intangi-
bles, by definition, have no physicality and thus present an im-
mediate conundrum regarding the source of income they pro-
duce.3
The second pressure concerns remote access to markets. This
is also a feature of the combined forces of globalization and tech-
nology. Globalization makes remote markets relevant. Technol-
ogy allows one to derive economic value from such markets with-
out being physically present, by targeting a market for sales
through the use of the Internet or by delivering skilled services
remotely. As with intangibles, this force has eroded part of what
constituted the historic source tax base—the taxation of foreign
enterprises tapping a local market, based on some local pres-
ence.
The third pressure presented is location savings. To be sure,
some may resist the juxtaposition of location savings with the
issues of intangibles and remote access to markets. The question
of location savings certainly has not historically demanded the
same degree of attention from either policymakers or scholars.
If one pauses for a moment, however, it is fairly evident that the
whole phenomenon of location savings is a key driver of globali-
zation on the production side (that is, in jurisdictions where
goods are made as opposed to consumed). At present, location
savings arise because markets are only partially integrated.
Since globalization is an ongoing, dynamic process, it is possible
to achieve savings (and ultimately profits) by relying on factor
inputs that are provided by relatively inexpensive markets. If
globalization were to reach some end state, then we would expect
the opportunity for such savings and profits to be nonexistent.
In that end state, such profits would have dissipated through
arbitrage across factor input markets until such markets were
fully integrated. We are not at that end state and likely will not
2. J. Clifton Fleming Jr., Robert J. Peroni, & Stephen E. Shay, The David
R. Tillinghast Lecture “What’s Source Got To Do With It?” Source Rules and
U.S. International Taxation, 56 TAX L. REV. 81, 84 (2002).
3. There is no immediate consensus on the precise definition of “intangi-
bles” for purposes of tax law. For the basic approach under U.S. law (which
includes both an extensive list of exemplars, as well as a catchall for items
similar to those in the enumerated list), see Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(b).
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be for many years. In the meantime, profits will arise from cost
savings through selective location of factor inputs. How does the
existing tax framework measure up with respect to this prob-
lem—the problem of location savings? This too presents a grave
challenge for source taxation.
Although the OECD’s basic stance in its BEPS action item 8
deliverable is that location savings generally do not present an
appropriate occasion for source taxation, this is likely to lead to
non-taxation of profits derived from location savings.4 A brief
sketch of an argument for this proposition runs as follows. First,
consider the basic OECD stance. Suppose the nature of the loca-
tion savings is from low-cost labor inputs, which generate an eco-
nomic rent—a “labor rent.”5 According to the OECD view, labor
rents will either be competed away in product markets (that is,
the savings will be passed on to consumers) or, pending dissipa-
tion, will be taxed to the party that would have bargained to re-
tain the profits at arm’s length.6 Assuming the affiliate that of-
fers the low-cost labor inputs functions in a competitive market
where unrelated parties also offer such inputs, one would expect
that a firm offering low-cost labor inputs would not be able to
bargain to retain the profit at arm’s length.7 Other actors would
undersell, ultimately competing away the rent as between the
factor input suppliers and shifting it to the factor-input pur-
chaser. Then, according to the OECD view, the affiliate provid-
ing the low-cost labor input should simply be compensated at the
prevailing (low) local market rate, thereby retaining none of the
rent.8 Any rent, in according to the OECD, would be taxed in the
hands of the party properly taxed on the intangibles related to
whatever products are produced with the benefit of the low-cost
labor inputs.
Importantly, however, this analysis seems incomplete. Of
course, one should accept that some cost savings will routinely
not be passed on to consumers, at least not right away. To state
the obvious, if cost savings were always passed on immediately
4. Mitchell Kane, Labour Rents, Arm’s Length Transfer Pricing, and Intan-
gibles: Still Searching for a Solution to the BEPS, 6 BULL. FOR INT’L TAX’N 371
(2015).
5. For elaboration on the concept of a “labor rent,” see id. at 372.
6. Id.
7. The U.S. Treasury regulations reach essentially the same result. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(4)(ii)(C).
8. See Kane, supra note 4, at 372–73.
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there would be no incentive for firms to realize location savings
in the first place. Therefore, there must generally be some pro-
spect of economic rent—a supernormal profit, pending the time
when market demand is fully met by firms that are benefitting
from the relevant location savings.9 Furthermore, to the extent
that any non-competed-away rent is attributed to the party en-
titled to intangible-related returns—as under the OECD trans-
fer pricing analysis—and to the extent the relevant intangibles
migrate to low-tax jurisdictions, the rents will face little or no
tax at all. Importantly, under the OECD approach, there is no
good way to pull the rent back into the tax base by adjustments
to transfer pricing of the relevant intangibles because, in the
OECD’s view, location savings do not constitute an “intangible”
for these purposes (as they are not capable of separate owner-
ship).10
The odd and troubling situation faced here is that the labor
rent will likely be reflected as a return to some intangible,
simply because the intangible is likely to pick up residual value
not otherwise captured in a transfer pricing analysis of routine
items, and not because the rent is actually a return to the intan-
gible. This point is crucial. To be concrete, if the labor rent arises
from low-cost labor inputs to make branded goods, any rent from
the low-labor cost is not derived from brand value. Indeed, em-
ploying low-cost labor may actually degrade brand value for
firms. Appropriate adjustments to transfer pricing of the brand
will thus not pick up the labor rent, even though the rent will
likely be taxed (or not taxed) in the same locale as the return to
the brand.
Importantly, there are substantial departures from the OECD
approach by key countries that offer location savings. These are
evident in the country-specific materials (though not in the gen-
eral discussion) in the United Nations Practical Manual on
Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries (“U.N. Manual”). The
most far-reaching approach is that espoused by China.11 Under
9. See Michael McKee & Michael McDonald, Location Savings in Compet-
itive Markets, 9 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 700 (2001) (arguing that
cost structures will vary across providers in the final market, and market price
to consumer will be determined by marginal supplier).
10. See ACTION 8 DELIVERABLE, supra note 1.
11. See U.N. DEP’T OF INT’L ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, U.N. PRACTICALMANUAL
ON TRANSFER PRICING FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, at ch. 10, U.N. Doc.
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China’s approach, an appropriate markup for a local affiliate
would be determined by referencing developed-country compa-
rables (on the grounds that comparables are difficult to locate
locally). More crucially, however, that markup is applied to both
the local cost base and to the difference in cost bases. In the ex-
ample provided, a local Chinese affiliate has costs of 100, even
though comparable services provided in developed countries
would involve costs of 150. The local affiliate in this case is enti-
tled to an 8 percent markup (determined by looking at devel-
oped-country comparables, as just mentioned) on the 100 base
and on the 50 differential. The markup applied to that difference
(i.e., .08 * 50 = 4) is the entirety of the profit attributable to “lo-
cation savings,” and it is all allocated to the local subsidiary.12
Although this is claimed to be consistent with the arm’s length
standard, it is not clear exactly how this is the case.
A similar issue is present in the country-specific materials
with respect to India.13 India takes the position that resort to
local-market comparables will not allocate any of the location
savings to the local subsidiary—and that this is in conflict with
an arm’s length result. The argument is that, at arm’s length, no
transaction would even occur unless each party enjoyed some
benefit from the mutual gains from trade. This would not seem,
however, to rebut the basic line of analysis presented in the
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and the U.N. Manual. At
least under the assumption that there is a thick local labor mar-
ket, a local company could be presumed to conclude contracts in
any case where it can earn themarket-clearing price for the mar-
ket to which it is constrained. This is just another way of putting
the bargaining power point mentioned above. If there is sharing
of the gains from a trade at arm’s length, this means there must
be some bargaining power at the level of the local production
company. If that is the case, then all authorities seem to agree
that part of the profit should be allocated to a local production
affiliate under an arm’s length standard.14 Authorities conflict
when there is no such bargaining power. The OECD Transfer
Pricing Guidelines and U.N. Manual provide for no allocation to
the local production subsidiary in such circumstances. India
ST/ESA/347 (2013), http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/docu-
ments/UN_Manual_TransferPricing.pdf.
12. For a full description of this example, see id. para. 10.3.3.9.
13. See id. para. 10.4.7.
14. See id. para. 5.3.2.45.
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would appear to take a contrary view, but again it is not clear
how this should be squared with an arm’s length approach.
Thus, all three of these issues—intangibles, remote access to
markets, and location savings—seem to pose various challenges
to source taxation. To date, both scholarly and policy focus has
largely been on the first two issues above.15 By contrast, the
OECD deals with the location savings issue in but a few short
paragraphs in the Transfer Pricing Guidelines. These challenges
have sometimes been fundamental, leading to draconian calls to
abandon, or at least greatly move away from, source-based tax-
ation on the grounds that the very nature of source tax is no
longer workable.16 Alternatively, the challenges have led to calls
for incremental reform to existing tax instruments to deal with
the problems of intangibles and remote access to markets.17 In
the category of incremental reform, one should include the con-
sideration of expansion of the historic permanent establishment
(“PE”) concept under Article 5 of the OECD Model Convention18
to deal with matters such as electronic commerce and remote
provision of services and specific measures to match the taxation
of intangible profit to the jurisdiction where intangible value has
been created.
As stated, this article’s particular concern is with the issue of
location savings (and associated location rents), but it also con-
templates fundamental and narrower, discrete reform. In recent
prior work, it has been generally argued that some of the ex-
treme criticisms of source taxation have been overstated.19 This
15. See Mitchell A. Kane, A Defense of Source Rules in International Taxa-
tion, 32 YALE J.ONREG. 311, 340–46 (discussing problems with applying source
rules to intangible assets); Walter Hellerstein, Jurisdiction to Tax in the Digi-
tal Economy: Permanent and Other Establishments, 6 BULL. FOR INT’L TAX’N
346 (2014) (discussing problems with the application of jurisdictional rules for
taxpayers who access markets remotely through the “digital economy”).
16. See Alan J. Auerbach, Michael P. Devereux, & Helen Simpson, Taxing
Corporate Income, in DIMENSIONS OF TAX DESIGN: THE MIRRLEES REVIEW 837,
882–88 (Stuart Adam et al. eds., 2010).
17. See ORG. FORECON. CO-OPERATION&DEV. [OECD], ADDRESSING THETAX
CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 - 2015 FINAL REPORT para.
210, at 87 (2015) (noting possible revision of the “preparatory and auxiliary”
standard under permanent establishment (“PE”) definitions to address expan-
sion of the digital economy).
18. MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL
art. 5 (ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION&DEV. 2014) [hereinafter OECDMODEL
CONVENTION].
19. See supra note 15.
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is not to say, however, that there is not a need to drastically re-
think the implementation of source taxation going forward. This
leads to the precise nature of the proposals offered in this article.
The first proposal—which will be referred to as the “transfer
pricing proposal”—articulates that arm’s length transfer pricing
in the case of location savings ought to proceed by compensating
local affiliates (where savings are realized) by reference to com-
parables based on the market of the purchaser of the input ra-
ther than the seller of the input, as is the case under the OECD
analysis. This would have the effect of pushing the taxation of
the location rent into the source country. To be clear, this stance
should remain, even in instances where there is a competitive
local market over the input and an unrelated party likely would
not be able to bargain to retain the rent.
The immediate response to this will be that one cannot possi-
bly adopt such an approach because it will simply invite organi-
zational distortion. If there is an additional source-country tax
imposed under this proposal, then parties will simply shift to ac-
quiring the input from unrelated parties. That would seemingly
run counter to the whole point of the arm’s length standard. This
concern may be overstated, however, as there may be independ-
ent reasons the firm does not want to acquire the input from un-
related parties.20
But, it also brings us to the second proposal—what will be re-
ferred to as the “source entitlement proposal.” It is implicit in
the criticism just sketched that if the transfer pricing analysis
pushes some of the location rent to the local affiliate, and if that
affiliate could not bargain for such rent at arm’s length, then
there would be greater source-country tax in the related party
case than in the unrelated party case. This is true under prevail-
ing norms of source taxation and under existing forms of double
taxation conventions, but this is a point of existing positive law,
not conceptual necessity. The obvious way to equalize the source
tax burden would be to tax the nonresident-related party on the
location rent on a source basis. That cannot happen under exist-
ing double tax conventions because the party will lack a PE
within the meaning of Article 5.21 This raises the question, how-
ever, of why this should necessarily be the case.
20. See supra Part I.A.3.
21. That is, the nonresident party would have neither a “fixed place of busi-
ness” PE under Article 5.1 nor an “agency” PE under Article 5.5. See OECD
MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 18, art. 5(1), (5).
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At present, policymakers approach these problems in a pre-
dictable, understandable way. Article 5 can be pushed at the
margins to deal with novel situations like e-commerce, but when
the procedural context is one of drafting commentary to a model
convention or passing domestic law and regulation aiming to be
consistent with ratified treaty text, then there are serious con-
straints on available reform options. Thus, in such a case, eve-
rybody tends to take the extent of source tax of the nonresident
party as a fixed point (established by Article 5).22 From there, it
is important to think about organizational neutrality under the
transfer pricing analysis. Operating an affiliate cannot generate
incremental source-country tax over and above what would be
collected from an unrelated party performing the same func-
tions. But, from the standpoint of theory, this perspective gets it
backward. The extent of source-country tax is the primary con-
cept, not organizational neutrality. In principle, first one needs
to know the proper bound of source-country tax given a certain
degree of economic activity. Once that issue is settled, we should
strive to write rules that do not distinguish between the case
where such economic activity is conducted through a related
party or by contract with an unrelated one.
To recap, this article advances two proposals: the transfer pric-
ing proposal and the source entitlement proposal. The transfer
pricing proposal provides that transfer pricing analysis in the
case of location savings and rents should resort to nonlocal com-
parables. The source entitlement proposal provides that we rad-
ically rethink the nature of the source tax entitlement over non-
residents in the case of location savings and rents under double
taxation conventions.
The remainder of this article will develop these proposals fur-
ther. Part I will further develop the normative argument for
source-country taxation of location rents. Part II will address
various implementation issues, complications, and likely objec-
tions. The arguments are general ones and should apply to the
full range of location savings and rents. For purposes of empha-
sis and specificity of exposition, however, the remainder of the
article will consider the case of labor savings and labor rents
22. See Sébastien Gonnet, Pim Fris, & Tommaso Coriano, Location Specific
Advantages –Principles, TRANSFERPRICING INT’L J., June 24, 2011, at 4 (stating
that allocation of right to income across entities under transfer pricing analysis
implies allocation of right to tax income across countries).
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specifically, as this is likely one of the most important sectors
where this issue arises.
I. SOURCE BASED TAXATION OF LABOR RENTS: A NORMATIVE
ANALYSIS
So far, this article has emphasized two basic points. First, ac-
cording to the near universal approach to the problem of location
rents under a functional transfer pricing analysis, local produc-
tion subsidiaries in competitive markets will only be compen-
sated based on the prevailing wage rate in the jurisdiction of la-
bor supply, thus allocating none of the labor rent to such subsid-
iary. Second, this approach presents a substantial opportunity
for BEPS, as the rents are likely to be absorbed as residual prof-
its associated with mobile intangibles, rents which cannot ade-
quately be dealt with under existing approaches to the transfer
pricing of intangibles.
If the current approach is grounded in basing the search for
labor comparables in the jurisdiction of labor supply (often re-
ferred to as the “local” labor market), the transfer pricing pro-
posal defended here is for labor comparables (and associated
compensation) to be based on the jurisdiction of labor demand.23
In the paradigmatic case of outsourcing of labor from a devel-
oped to a developing country, the basic result, under the transfer
pricing proposal, would be that the developing country subsidi-
ary is compensated as a labor input provider, the same compen-
sation scheme prior to the decision to outsource. This part of the
article will evaluate this proposal with respect to three criteria:
efficiency consequences, doctrinal implications of existing treaty
text under Article 9, and internation distribution.
A. Efficiency Consequences
The discussion of the efficiency consequences of the transfer
pricing proposal will focus on three points. First, there is an im-
portant issue of tradeoffs to consider. Specifically, although the
transfer pricing proposal could be expected to lead to organiza-
tional distortions, it is also the case that the transfer pricing pro-
posal would yield certain efficiency gains to the extent it involves
23. The proposal is thus similar to the position defended by China, as de-
scribed in the U.N. Manual and discussed above. The goal in this part of the
article is to offer a normative defense of this result within the bounds of a jus-
tifiable understanding of the arm’s length principle.
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incremental taxation of currently untaxed rents. Second, organ-
izational distortions under the transfer pricing proposal could be
removed if we reconsider the basic source entitlement in this
context. Third, even if the source entitlement is not revised, any
organizational distortion from the transfer pricing proposal may
well be diminished by the fact that there are independent ad-
vantages to operating through a related party structure.
1. Tradeoffs Between Organizational Neutrality and Non-dis-
tortionary Rents Taxes
As already noted, from an efficiency standpoint, the almost
certain response to the transfer pricing proposal is that it would
invite substantial distortions of organizational form. The stand-
ard transfer pricing analysis in a thick local labor market is
premised on the idea that a production subsidiary at arm’s
length would not be able to bargain for any part of the labor rent.
Thus, in order to equalize the commonly controlled and arm’s
length cases, one must not allocate any of the labor rent to the
commonly controlled subsidiary. Any alternate approach, under
which one attempts to tax part of the labor rent in the jurisdic-
tion of labor supply, would seem to invite taxpayers to contract
with unrelated parties instead. That result would fly in the face
of the basic commitment to organizational neutrality across com-
monly controlled enterprises and unrelated enterprises, which
is a bedrock principle of the arm’s length standard in the first
place. Why is this not a disqualifying critique of the transfer
pricing proposal? Why would one ever define the relevant mar-
ket for comparables as anything other than the market where
the labor is in fact supplied?
The answer to these questions begins with a reminder that the
entire analysis in this article is premised on some degree of seg-
mentation in the international markets for factor inputs. Be-
cause of segmentation, we do not even come close to equalization
of after-tax wages on an international basis. With the assump-
tion of segmented markets, one can now introduce an important
distinction between cases where units of a multinational enter-
prise are operating within a segment of a segmented market ver-
sus where the units are operating across segments.
The former instance presents a strong case to resort to local-
market comparables on the grounds of organizational neutrality.
Further, while extension of the argument to the case involving
intrafirm trade across segments is very tempting (and consistent
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with the standard analysis adopted under the OECD Transfer
Pricing Guidelines and the U.N. Manual), this case actually pre-
sents a range of further complications that, to date, have not
been adequately analyzed.
In order to illustrate the case of a multinational enterprise op-
erating within a segment, consider the following example. As-
sume at the outset that a U.S. manufacturing firm produces
branded goods that it is selling in Canada through a local Cana-
dian distribution subsidiary. The U.S. firm then moves the man-
ufacturing function inside the Canadian subsidiary but retains
the valuable intellectual property in the United States. To com-
plete the example we need two further factual assumptions.
First, suppose that the U.S.-Canadian labor market is essen-
tially integrated because barriers to immigration, language ac-
quisition, relocation costs, etc., are sufficiently low, such that
any differences in after-tax wages can be expected to dissipate
in equilibrium. Second, suppose that the Canadian corporate tax
rate is higher than the U.S. rate. With these assumptions, there
is a very good reason, when determining the profits of the Cana-
dian subsidiary, to define the market for labor services based on
the integrated market of which the United States and Canada
are components. For example, consider the likely result if one
did not take that approach. The taxpayer would have an incen-
tive to minimize the allocation to the return to labor inputs in
Canada, where the tax is higher. It could attempt to do so by
basing the Canadian subsidiary’s cost-plus markup on a sample
of labor inputs that includes a nonintegrated labor market, say
Mexico, where the returns to labor are lower. Strictly from a tax
perspective, this would give the combined group a competitive
advantage over similarly situated parties operating at arm’s
length. In the arm’s length case, an unrelated Canadian manu-
facturing company would demand the higher return to labor
commanded by the Canadian market, thereby driving up the tax
burden. This would provide a pure tax reason to bring the firms
under common control, thus violating the basic principle of or-
ganizational neutrality that supports adoption of the arm’s
length standard in the first place.
Now, let us consider the case where the U.S. enterprise in fact
operates across segments of a nonintegrated market. To be sure,
one can construct an entirely parallel fact pattern, which would
demonstrate the same prospect of organizational distortion in
cases where comparables are based on a sample that includes
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data from a different market segment. Thus, consider a case in
which the U.S. enterprise has moved its manufacturing to Mex-
ico, has migrated its intellectual property to Bermuda, and con-
ducts sales/distribution in the United States and Canada. If we
were to assume that Mexico has a relatively low corporate tax
rate, then the mirror image of the Canadian case is produced.
The integrated firm would have the incentive to benchmark the
return to the labor inputs of the Mexican subsidiary by reference
to the relatively high-cost labor inputs in Canada. This would
shift profit to Mexico and lower the tax burden. By contrast, at
arm’s length, the U.S. company would likely bargain for a Mex-
ican production counterparty to earn only what the segmented
Mexican labor market would bear. This would also result in a
tax-motivated reason to favor common corporate control over
contractual arrangements between unrelated parties, seemingly
once again in violation of the foundational premise of arm’s
length transfer pricing.
The assumption of segmented markets is crucial to the analy-
sis, however, because it tells us that, at least in the near term,
the firm can earn not only normal returns but also economic
rents from buying labor in one segment of the market and selling
finished products in another. Such rents are not available, of
course, so long as the firm is operating within a segment of the
market as opposed to across segments. This factor is central to
the efficiency analysis because, in such circumstances, it is far
from clear that one should view the efficiency costs of organiza-
tional distortion in isolation.
Achieving organizational neutrality in these circumstances
comes at a very real cost—namely, it implicates the non-taxation
of at least a portion of labor rents generated by outsourcing.
Such non-taxation of rents is an unequivocally bad outcome from
an efficiency standpoint. For a given revenue constraint, the
non-taxation of rents implies the unnecessary use of some fiscal
instrument with distorting effects (assuming, as is always the
case, that at least some such instruments are actually in place).
In short, the efficiency consequences of the case where multi-
nationals operate across segmented markets is importantly in-
complete if we look only at the organizational consequences un-
der current law. A more complete analysis would compare the
cost of potential distortions to organizational form to the benefits
from incremental taxation of rents (and reduction of otherwise
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distortionary taxes). In general, one confronts an important ten-
sion in this context. It is possible to follow the status quo and
eliminate organizational distortions, but this likely comes at the
cost of undertaxation of the relevant labor rents. Alternatively,
one could divert from the status quo and attempt to tax a greater
portion of the labor rent, but this would seem to come at the cost
of inviting organizational distortion.
This raises the issue of how one could possibly balance these
two effects across the range of real world scenarios where they
are likely to be implicated. This would be incredibly difficult to
say the least. There are, however, two mitigating factors from an
efficiency standpoint.
First, the organizational distortion that would seem to arise
under the proposed approach is a creature of the combined effect
of the rules regarding the commonly controlled scenario and the
unrelated party scenario. Yet, the tax rules regarding the unre-
lated party scenario are themselves contingent and could be re-
visited. This implicates this article’s source entitlement pro-
posal, which is a radical rethinking of the scope of Article 5.
Second, even if such radical change was not made, imposition
of tax on a portion of the labor rent would not automatically
drive firms to adopt an unrelated party structure, thus yielding
all cost (distortion to organizational form) and no benefit (i.e.,
zero tax on rents because nobody elects the form that bears the
extra tax). Such a result is unlikely because we suspect there are
further (pretax) rents to be earned strictly from firm integration
(particularly where there is exploitation of valuable intellectual
property). Those rents would similarly go untaxed in the current
regime for much the same reason as with respect to labor rents.
This suggests that there may be some cushion to tax labor rents
without driving firms out of the preferred organizational form.
2. Rethinking Article 5—the Source Entitlement Proposal
This article has discussed how labor rents present a problem
of BEPS under current approaches to arm’s length transfer pric-
ing. One should remember though that the very prospect of or-
ganizational distortion (in the case where there is an attempt to
tax the rent) presumes that taxpayers can also achieve low to
zero tax on labor rents in the unrelated party context. That
seems almost certain to be the case. To continue with the exam-
ple of a segmented market, if we imagine the U.S. parent com-
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pany contracts with an unrelated Mexican counterparty for pro-
vision of low-cost labor inputs and is able to bargain for a price
reflecting the local conditions in the Mexican labor market, then
of course the U.S. company could avail itself of any available in-
tangible migration strategies to keep tax levels on the labor rent
low. Efforts to combat such strategies through legal instruments
on the transfer pricing of intangibles would be ineffective, and
also for the reasons already discussed.
The crucial point to observe is that the taxation of the com-
monly controlled case and the unrelated party case arise under
two completely different sets of doctrine. To assert organiza-
tional distortion when one alters one body of doctrine (as pro-
posed in altering the interpretation of the arm’s length standard
under the transfer pricing proposal in this article) is to ignore
the fact that the distortion is a consequence of the simultaneous
operation of both bodies of doctrine. Moreover, although there
may be reasons grounded in inertia to hold treatment of the un-
related party case constant, there is no good reason as an ana-
lytical matter to ignore the possibility of the doctrine in that
evolving area as well.
We confront a general problem here: How should one deal with
the taxation of labor rents in the case of segmented labor mar-
kets and (imperfectly) competitive product markets? That gen-
eral problem transcends organizational form, precisely because
the rent can arise in both the related and unrelated scenario.
Figuring out the proper taxation of the labor rents should thus
take analytical priority. In other words, it is unambiguously true
that from an efficiency standpoint one should impose a tax on
the labor rents, if possible, and use such revenues to reduce
other distortionary tax instruments. It is then a secondary ques-
tion of whether one can achieve taxation of the labor rents in an
international setting in a way that does not introduce a different
type of distortion, namely a distortion to organizational form.
Answering that secondary question requires paying attention to
the relevant doctrine for each organizational form.
The transfer pricing proposal is a doctrinal response regarding
the commonly controlled case. What is the analog in the unre-
lated party case? Of course, the mere fact that at arm’s length
the firm that is contracting for labor inputs has market power to
bargain for the labor rent does not solve the question about
which jurisdiction should be allocated the rent for tax purposes.
Rather, it simply means that the jurisdiction of labor supply will
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not be able to tax the rent in the hands of a local production com-
pany under a residence theory of taxation. But, it tells us noth-
ing about whether it should be able to reach the rent in the
hands of the foreign firm under a theory of source-based taxa-
tion.
To be sure, there is no prospect of reaching labor rents under
a source theory with current instantiations of double taxation
conventions. Amending the current regime in a way that would
allow this is not likely contemplated by anything in the (very
expansive) charge under the BEPS project.24 But, it remains im-
portant to pose the question, even if the modifications to the cur-
rent rules would be viewed as radical. Further, it is fairly
straightforward to state what the modified rules would have to
look like. Reaching the labor rent in the hands of the purchaser
of the labor inputs under a source theory would require two basic
doctrinal modifications: one to the PE standard and a second to
the determination of profits attributable to a PE.
First, it would be necessary to relax the standard for what con-
stitutes a PE under Article 5.25 Specifically, the basic change
from current law would be that a PE could arise merely in virtue
of purchasing activity, where such purchasing activity generates
labor rents from labor inputs.26
It should also be mentioned that, although the context is a fa-
miliar one, this proposal goes quite a bit beyond historical argu-
ments raised by jurisdictions that are prominent hosts to labor
outsourcing arrangements. For example, consider the litigation
that culminated in the decision before the Indian Supreme Court
in DIT v. Morgan Stanley.27 In that case, the Indian Supreme
Court considered whether the taxpayer, Morgan Stanley, had a
24. Admittedly, action item 7 in the BEPS Action Plan deals with the “arti-
ficial avoidance of PE status.” The core of that action item, however, deals with
matters such as the use of commissionaire structures to plan around the
agency rules in Article 5. The proposal in the text goes much beyond this, as it
would implicate PE status in the absence of anything that remotely resembles
an agency relationship. It would thus require revisions to Article 5 that would
seem to go well beyond what is contemplated by action item 7 (or anything else
in the BEPS Action Plan).
25. OECDMODELCONVENTION, supra note 18, art. 5.
26. Recall that these arguments are meant to be general to location savings
and rents. Thus, a proper revision to Article 5 would cover the purchase of any
factor inputs generating location rents.
27. DIT (Int’l Taxation), Mumbai v. Morgan Stanley & Co., (2007) 8 SCR 52
(India).
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PE in India in the form of outsourced back office functions per-
formed by a controlled subsidiary in India.28 The court concluded
that there was neither a fixed place of business PE nor an agency
PE.29 A decision running in the other direction would have likely
destabilized the general understanding and interpretation of Ar-
ticle 5, under which the circumstances in which a controlled sub-
sidiary creates a PE are relatively rare.30 The source entitlement
proposal, however, is really addressing something different. It is
advocating for a substantive change in which there would be a
PE strictly in virtue of certain sorts of purchasing activity
(namely those that give to labor rents) from an unrelated party.
Though creating numerous complicated issues, the proposal
would not destabilize the traditional understanding of when
subsidiaries function as PEs. In other words, it does not advocate
for also treating the controlled subsidiary as giving rise to a PE
in the context of labor rents. In that case, the rent would be taxed
in the hands of the controlled subsidiary under the transfer pric-
ing proposal that looks to the jurisdiction of labor demand for
appropriate comparables. More specifically, in the case of the
controlled subsidiary, that subsidiary should be viewed as pur-
chasing low-cost labor inputs (from its employees) and then
providing such labor on to the parent at the higher labor cost
associated with the parent’s labor market. The spread is thus
booked at the controlled subsidiary level. In the unrelated party
case, the unrelated corporation would be viewed as purchasing
the low-cost labor inputs and passing them on to the foreign
counterparty at a relatively low price (i.e., at the price reflecting
actual market conditions). The very fact that the foreign coun-
terparty can acquire at this deflated price is the element that
would drive the PE determination.
Although this is radical, it is worth considering the fact that
the original architects of the PE concept were almost certainly
not thinking about this general class of problems. It is by now a
stale truism to observe how much the economy has changed
since the original formulation of the concepts that underlie the
current international tax framework. As international tax law-
yers confront this ever-evolving space, they should be mindful
28. Id. at 60–68.
29. Id. at 65–66.
30. See OECD MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 18, art 5.
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that the appropriate normative source taxation base should gen-
erate the boundaries of the doctrinal PE concept, not vice versa.
What is the appropriate normative base here? It is worth ob-
serving that, even under existing norms, if a source country were
to nationalize the labor production function or grant a monopoly
right to the labor production function to a single private firm,
there would be no issue about the right of the source country to
tax the labor rent. Under nationalization, it would retain the
rent in the first instance, as it could charge prices up to the point
that just undercut the prevailing rates in the jurisdiction of labor
demand. Under single firmmonopoly, the analysis would be that
single firms could bargain to retain the labor rents. It can be
assumed that no one would find these results objectionable on a
normative analysis of the appropriate scope of source taxation
because it is understood that, in some sense, the rent is local to
the source country. It is geographically tied to it. Now, suppose
the source country disbands the monopoly and competing local
firms offer the same labor input as before (or perhaps even with
superiority and greater costs savings, if competition is beneficial
to productivity). It is extremely difficult to articulate any norma-
tive argument why the mere fact of local firm competition should
erode the normative base for source taxation. That is, of course,
an easy result to achieve if it is assumed that one wants organi-
zational neutrality as a paramount concern, but the entirety of
the point here is to give priority of analysis to the proper source
theory of taxation.
Finally, it is important to mention a more mundane point,
which ties the proposal more closely to existing understandings
of PE than might have originally been thought. Specifically, if
one considers the basic notion of “permanency” embedded in the
general concept, it is worth observing that the relevant loca-
tional savings could well have temporal duration far in excess of
the temporal cutoffs that would push a taxpayer outside of the
various safe harbors under Article 5.31
Second, it would be necessary to change the approach to at-
tributable profits under Article 7.32 Consistent with the basic
goal of organizational neutrality, one could tailor the approach
to that described above for commonly controlled parties. Thus,
31. For example, under Article 5.3, the safe harbor for building sites and
construction or installation projects is twelve months. See id. art. 5(3).
32. Id. art. 7.
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the PE could be treated as if it were a separate entity purchasing
the labor inputs at the price stipulated in the arm’s length con-
tract and then selling the labor inputs to a parent of the devel-
oped country at a markup reflecting the price of the associated
labor in comparable transactions in the jurisdiction of labor de-
mand. There are some obvious pitfalls here that would likely
generate objections. Perhaps most problematically, the approach
would require a search for comparables where currently there is
none because current rules would not generate a PE and thus no
need to determine attributable profits on these facts. But, the
proper response is that the PE threshold should be set inde-
pendently based on an appropriate theory of source taxation.
The need for comparables flows from that determination; poten-
tial difficulties with comparables should not themselves deter-
mine the appropriate extent of the source tax. Moreover, as a
general matter, it is well established that developed countries
have far superior databases of comparables upon which to draw
as compared to developing countries. Companies may like that
there is no comparables analysis in the developed countries un-
der current law, but to let that point dictate the substantive PE
standard seems to get things backward. Further, it might seem
odd that under Article 7 one would have to search for compara-
bles (in the jurisdiction of labor demand) when one already
seems to be sitting on a perfect benchmark—the actual contract
concluded at arm’s length. But, this just reflects the fact that
Articles 5 and 7 have not, to date, been tested with respect to the
very difficult problem of segmented markets for factor inputs.
3. Organizational Distortions and the Cushion to Tax Organi-
zational Gains
In the absence of the admittedly radical modification to Arti-
cles 5 and 7 in the way just discussed, the chief criticism of the
transfer pricing proposal would likely continue to be its creation
of organizational distortions. Here, this article will address the
magnitude of this organizational neutrality issue, as the prob-
lem may not be as large as it appears upon first glance. Specifi-
cally, one must take into account the relevance of organizational
rents under arm’s length transfer pricing. An incremental tax on
labor rents earned solely through an organizational form of com-
mon control (as would be the case with modification of the geo-
graphic market definition under a functional analysis without
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corresponding modification of Articles 5 and 7) would automati-
cally lead to shifts toward the unrelated form, only if the organ-
izational forms are otherwise equally profitable. But, this will
often not be the case. It is a basic lesson from the literature on
the theory of the firm that ownership or common control should
be understood to arise when this is more profitable than operat-
ing at arm’s length by contract. In the literature on multination-
als, it is common to explain ownership of foreign subsidiaries un-
der a transaction costs story.33 This is often the case, for exam-
ple, where a firm uses valuable intellectual property in its pro-
duction processes. A firm with valuable intellectual property
may thus identify a jurisdiction with low labor costs but be un-
willing to contract with unrelated service providers because of
expropriation risk. Put another way, the firm can earn profits
through common control that it could not earn at arm’s length.
This amount can be referred to as the organizational or synergy
rent. It is now a very familiar critique of the arm’s length stand-
ard that it is inherently flawed because no comparables-based
approach could ever capture the elements of profit that literally
cannot be earned at arm’s length.34
In prior work, I have argued that the issue of synergy rents
does not amount to an inherent flaw in arm’s length transfer
pricing.35 Whether one accepts the standard “inherent flaw” cri-
tique or not, there is a very real possibility that synergy rents
arising from organizational form remain lightly taxed. The me-
chanics whereby firms can achieve that result is much the same
as with labor rents. That is, under current transfer pricing ap-
proaches, there is no meaningful way to capture such value
through an analysis of comparables. The value can only be cap-
tured through a focus on residuals, and this creates the likeli-
hood that such residual value will be absorbed into other, diffi-
cult to value, mobile intangibles.
This article will not attempt to provide a full discussion of the
best solution to the broader problem of organizational rents.
33. See, e.g., Mihir A. Desai & James Hines, Evaluating International Tax
Reform, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 487, 488 (2003).
34. See ORG. FORECON. CO-OPERATION ANDDEV. [OECD], TRANSFER PRICING
GUIDELINES FORMULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND TAX ADMINISTRATIONS para.
1.10 (2010) [hereinafter OECDGUIDELINES].
35. See Mitchell A. Kane, Transfer Pricing, Integration and Synergy Intan-
gibles: A Consensus Approach to the Arm’s Length Standard, 6 WORLD TAX J.
282 (2014).
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Many scholars use the problem as an opportunity to reject fully
the arm’s length standard.36 A less radical approach (working
within the parameters of the arm’s length standard) might seek
to introduce further defined intangibles into the analysis in a
better attempt to reflect the gains from organization. Here, how-
ever, the approach of introducing specific synergy intangibles, a
position that mirrors the view presented in the BEPS action
item 8 deliverable should be rejected.37
To the extent that organizational rents remain undertaxed,
the best approach would be enhanced rules on the migration of
intangibles and/or the strengthening of controlled foreign corpo-
ration (CFC) rules. Even this approach will not be perfect, as
CFC rules can be difficult to enforce.38 Further, absent the un-
likely coordination of national level CFC rules, stricter ap-
proaches to inclusion of foreign-source intangibles income will
lead to predictable migrations of corporate residence in order to
benefit from less stringent CFC rules. The bottom line here
would seem to be that, currently, synergy rents from organiza-
tional form are almost certainly undertaxed and will likely re-
main undertaxed for the indefinite future. The relevance of this
to the labor rents problem under consideration here should be
clear. If there are untaxed organizational rents, then there is
some cushion to impose relatively more onerous taxation of labor
rents earned by integrated firms compared to those operating at
arm’s length without generating an organizational distortion. To
be more concrete, if a firm fears piracy when outsourcing to an
unrelated provider of labor, then the amount of surplus value it
places on the commonly controlled form can be taxed (in the
guise of a tax on labor rents) without leading to switches in or-
ganizational structure.
To be clear, this article does not intend to suggest that one
could plausibly measure with any precision the organizational
premium and tailor the taxation of labor rents accordingly. Nor
does it ignore the fact that the rents from organizational form
could be expected to be competed away over time, thus rendering
36. Id. at 284.
37. Id.
38. See I.R.C. §§ 951–965, for the United States’ CFC rules. These rules at-
tempt to strike a compromise between current taxation of certain (generally
passive) income earned by controlled foreign subsidiaries and deferred taxa-
tion of certain (generally active) income earned by controlled foreign subsidi-
aries.
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the cushion a diminishing quantity. As a first-best option, one
would want to measure the organizational rents directly and ac-
curately and formulate a non-distortionary rents tax on that ba-
sis. What this article suggests is two steps removed from this, as
it is not proposing an attempted quantification of the organiza-
tional rents, and the thing to be taxed (labor rents) is, as I have
set up the problem, conceptually separate from the organiza-
tional rents (insofar as I presume the rents could be earned by
parties contracting at arm’s length as well). Even so, there is
substantial merit to the point made here, which is offered in a
qualitative vein rather than demanding strict quantification.
There likely is some cushion. In this way, the argument to tax
labor rents becomes less of an implausible option than it first
appears.
There is an appealing conceptual purity to the strong claim for
geographic market limitation and strict adherence to organiza-
tional neutrality as it exists in the OECD Transfer Pricing
Guidelines. But, it is also helpful to step back and remind our-
selves of the big picture. Currently, numerous multinational en-
terprises hold valuable intellectual property and benefit from
low-cost labor inputs that are used with the retention of intellec-
tual property in-house. Further, many of these firms would seem
to bear relatively low overall tax rates. Against this backdrop, it
would seem quite plausible that there is space to increase the
tax burdens on these firms without thereby inviting some whole-
sale shift into less efficient organizational forms. If this looks
like an unappealing ad hoc approach, it is worth remembering
the various defects under the current approach.
B. Doctrinal Analysis Under Article 9
The above subsection analyzed the efficiency case for the
transfer pricing proposal advanced in this article regarding allo-
cating labor rents to controlled production subsidiaries. In par-
ticular, it dealt with ways of minimizing the efficiency costs from
distortions to organizational form that would seem to result from
the proposal. This section will address the relevant doctrinal
analysis under Article 9. In particular, this section will evaluate
whether it is consistent with Article 939 to interpret the arm’s
length standard in a way that would seem to lead to disparity of
39. OECDMODELCONVENTION, supra note 18, art. 9.
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treatment as between the commonly controlled taxpayers and
unrelated taxpayers.
It is important to note as an initial observation that the foun-
dational reason to adopt an arm’s length standard in the first
place is not limited to the fact that it helps to achieve non-dis-
torted choices regarding organizational form. To be sure, if com-
monly controlled entities are required to implement prices and
report profits in the same fashion as unrelated parties then
there will be no tax advantage to taking on the organizational
form reflecting common control. Such decisions, rather, would
reflect pretax gains to an organization.40 But, there are other
reasons to adopt an arm’s length standard, most importantly
that an arm’s length standard supplies access to undistorted in-
formation that can be used to check taxpayer incentives to shift
profit.41 This can overlap with the first consideration, but it is
very important to see that the organizational neutrality aspect
of the arm’s length standard and the information aspect of the
arm’s length standard are analytically distinct. Consider, for ex-
ample, the many cases that will arise in practice where com-
monly controlled firms realize a (pretax) premium from organi-
zational form and also potentially realize further (after-tax) pre-
mium through the manipulation of intercompany prices. There
may be a wide range of adjustments the tax administrator could
make that would be consistent with leaving organizational in-
centives in place. Arm’s length pricing is one such approach, but
why is this elevated above other possible approaches? The infor-
mation aspect of the arm’s length standard provides an answer.
Specifically, this accords with the way in which the tax admin-
istrator treats market prices as sound, non-manipulated infor-
mation as a generalmatter in questions of administering the in-
come tax.42 In light of these two aspects driving the arm’s length
standard (organization and information), it would be wrong to
40. See OECDGUIDELINES, supra note 34, para. 1.8.
41. See I.R.S. Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.B. 458.
42. A third justification for the arm’s length approach is the argument from
consensus, which is really a point about path dependency. The point here is
that there is good reason to implement arm’s length transfer pricing because
most countries have already coordinated around this approach and it would be
costly to forge consensus on some other basis. See OECD GUIDELINES, supra
note 34, para. 1.9. As a practical matter, this may be the most important con-
sideration of all. It is ignored here, however, because it is not a substantive
argument in favor of the standard and thus cannot be used to inform the con-
tent of specific prescriptions, such as that regarding market definition.
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conclude that issues of organizational neutrality must always be
paramount in application of the standard.
Moreover, there is nothing in the language of Article 9 itself
that provides any meaningful guidance on how to deal with the
problem of locational savings or locational rents.43 One imagines
that the original drafters of Article 9 were not really focused on
the problem of segmented markets in the first place. Even within
an integrated market, the problem of locating suitable compara-
bles will loom large. Thus, it is plausible to think that from the
outset the issue of the arm’s length standard producing a range
of results was recognized. The need to deal with such a range
would have been apparent from the earliest attempts to admin-
ister the arm’s length standard.
The issue here, though, is different. With segmented markets,
a comparables based analysis could produce either multiple, dis-
crete ranges (if we keep the markets separate) or a single, par-
ticularly intractable range (if we simply combine the markets).
It is apparent that it would be a natural result and interpreta-
tion to avoid the latter result. Working on the assumption that
the markets should be kept separate, to which market should
one look? The relevant treaty text would seem to provide no
guidance. The comparables suggested under the transfer pricing
proposal (based on the jurisdiction of labor demand), after all,
certainly are arm’s length prices. They just happen to be the
wrong arm’s length prices if one elevates the principle of organ-
izational neutrality above everything else. While granting that
issues of organizational neutrality are crucially important, as
suggested above, it is a stretch to say that organizational neu-
trality should necessarily be the dominant interpretive consid-
eration. To the contrary, taken against the backdrop of the
broader function of double tax conventions, of which the rules on
arm’s length transfer pricing obviously form only one part, the
goal of organizational neutrality should plausibly be subordi-
nated to the broader goals of eliminating double taxation and
preserving the tax base.
On this score, it is plausible that my proposal is better than
the standard approach. It relies on arm’s length prices from a
single, segmented labor market and provides as good a chance
as the current approach in reaching coordinated agreement to
avoid double taxation. In terms of preserving the tax base, the
43. See generally OECDMODELCONVENTION, supra note 18, art. 9.
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basic argument is that the proposal is better than the current
approach (which will likely result in the value from the labor
rent being absorbed into other firm intangibles), with the in-
creased likelihood that this portion of the base will face low or
zero tax. Given the character of the portion of the base under
consideration as a rent, this is a particularly harmful result.
There should be room to tax this rent without discouraging effi-
cient relocation of labor services. Under current approaches,
however, we are unlikely to achieve this.
There is one final argument that needs to be addressed regard-
ing the range of permissible interpretations of the arm’s length
standard under Article 9. The arm’s length standard under Ar-
ticle 9 could be read to mean that each contracting state may
only tax resident enterprises up to the amount that they would
have earned had the enterprise been operating at arm’s length.44
If that were the actual meaning and function of Article 9, then
one might argue as follows. A controlled subsidiary operating in
a jurisdiction of low labor costs would not be able to bargain for
any portion of the labor rent given the dynamic of the segmented
labor markets. Thus, the proper reading of Article 9 would be
that it functions as a substantive limit on the ability of the juris-
diction of labor supply to tax the labor rent in the hands of the
affiliate.
Under what I have called the “fractional” interpretation of Ar-
ticle 9 in my prior work, this is not a convincing reading of Arti-
cle 9.45 As a functional matter, the arm’s length standard per-
forms two basic roles regarding allocation of the tax base in the
treaty context. First, it grants contracting states the right to re-
state reported profits, leading to tax liabilities that would not
have been permissible under the treaty absent restatement (be-
cause of limits under Articles 546 and 747 on the ability to tax the
party initially reporting the profits). Second, it functions as a
limit on the ability of a state to restate profit. Reference to an
44. See OECDMODEL CONVENTION, supra note 18, art. 9.
45. SeeKane, supra note 35. In that paper, I linked the faulty interpretation
with the mistaken view that the arm’s length standard is conceptually flawed
because it cannot give a substantive allocation of the gains from organization,
which cannot (by definition) be earned at arm’s length. That criticism fails be-
cause, under the best reading of what the arm’s length standard is doing, it is
not meant to achieve substantive allocation of that premium.
46. OECDMODELCONVENTION, supra note 18, art. 5.
47. Id. art. 7.
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arm’s length standard, then, should be viewed as an effective
means of coordinating one state’s adjustment to stated profits
and the other jurisdiction’s acceptance of that restatement.
What matters then is coordination—not the use of an arm’s
length standard to allocate profits that could not have been
earned at arm’s length. But, once one views the matter as merely
coordination over arm’s length profits, there is no immediate
reason to assume that greater coordination will occur with a
benchmark that looks to comparables based on the jurisdiction
of labor supply rather than the jurisdiction of labor demand. The
bottom line is that, as an interpretive matter, there is no clear
indication from the text of Article 948 or the broader function of
double taxation conventions on how to treat the problem of labor
rents (or locational savings more generally). Any approach is
likely to involve tradeoffs of important goals of the overall frame-
work. One needs to countenance those broader tradeoffs rather
than fall back upon doctrinal interpretations that would empha-
size only a subset of the relevant considerations.
C. Internation Distribution
The previous two subsections have argued that (i) source tax-
ation of labor rents can be defended on efficiency grounds and
(ii) the transfer pricing proposal to allocate labor rents to local
production subsidiaries is doctrinally consistent with Article 9.
Under that proposal, tax base would be allocated to developing
countries where labor outsourcing takes place. This section will
discuss the defensibility of that result from the standpoint of in-
ternation distribution. Supposing it is a desirable outcome to tax
labor rents, the question of which jurisdiction should be accorded
that part of the tax base is somewhat complicated. Since we are
talking about a species of “location savings,” there is a natural
impulse to conclude that the jurisdiction where the savings arise
should tax the rent. But, what is the actual basis for this? After
all, if the question were simply a matter of efficiency in the sense
of reduction in worldwide deadweight loss we could generate
other prescriptions. For example, if Country A has a very high
marginal cost of funds and Country B a very low marginal cost
of funds, then one could increase efficiency by having Country A
tax a rent that is location specific to Country B and remove one
48. Id. art. 9.
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of its relatively distortionary instruments. Such a line of analy-
sis, however, is not convincing. Whatever the potential for world-
wide reduction in deadweight loss, we are so far removed from a
situation which takes equalization of marginal cost of funds
across jurisdictions to be a goal that it is near impossible to con-
sider forming international tax policy around such an outcome.49
From a realistic point of view, the best one could hope to do is
assess how the implementation of a rents tax would improve the
marginal cost of funds of a given jurisdiction. But, if we may not
use a standard of relative reduction, then on what basis should
one determine which jurisdiction is entitled to tax? Not all rents
are alike for these purposes. Some rents are not location specific,
in which case it is difficult to say much of anything about which
jurisdiction should collect the tax. That situation presents a
problem of pure, arbitrary coordination. It makes sense for some
jurisdiction to tax the rent, but typical tax competitive pressures
will drive the rate of tax to a suboptimal level.
In other cases, however, rents might reflect the effects of prior
state investment. In this case, it is sound policy for the jurisdic-
tion that incurred the cost of the investment to have the entitle-
ment to the tax. The existence of the rent here essentially re-
flects some unpriced government-provided benefit, and granting
the right to tax the jurisdiction providing the benefit will pre-
serve the incentives to make investments in the first place.
This provides a potential basis for according the jurisdiction of
labor supply the entitlement to tax labor rents. In the case of
unskilled labor rents, it may be fairly difficult to identify the na-
ture of the investment that makes the rent possible.50 However,
one plausible story is that developing countries that are able to
attract buyers of outsourced labor are those jurisdictions where
labor is relatively inexpensive compared to the case in other de-
veloping countries, precisely because some state investment in
infrastructure and institutions relieves foreign enterprises of
the need to incur certain costs privately. If that is the case, one
could then characterize jurisdictions that supply relatively low-
49. Consider, for example, just how radical a world like that would look.
Given the increasing distortionary costs of tax with increasing marginal rates,
countries with systematically smaller public sectors would have to collect tax
on behalf of countries with systematically larger public sectors.
50. With skilled labor, by contrast, matters may be clearer to the extent that
the skilled labor force represents obvious investment in human capital
through, for example, state-provided education.
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cost labor as enjoying a sort of return on state investment. A less
happy story is that the low labor cost does not reflect so much
state decisions about investment but rather state decisions to
compete downward on regulatory standards.
II. PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES
This Part addresses potential issues with the proposals offered
in this article. This Part will focus on the transfer pricing pro-
posal, as this is the more concrete proposal that works off an ex-
isting doctrinal base. Everything said here, however, ultimately
informs the source entitlement proposal as well, given that the
ultimate goal would be to adopt a treaty architecture that taxes
labor rents on a PE theory and on a related affiliate theory in
the same fashion. The first set of issues relates to measurement
of labor rents, and the second set of issues relates to tax compe-
tition.
A. Measurement of Labor Rent
This section considers two practical measurement problems.
The first relates to the question of dissipation of the labor rent
over time in the product market. The second relates to the de-
termination of the appropriate labor demand market under the
proposed comparables test.
1. Dissipation of Rent
The overarching theme of this article is that it would be desir-
able to shift the taxation of labor rents to the jurisdiction of labor
supply. Within the context of arm’s length transfer pricing, this
presents a very complicated problem of measurement. The rea-
son is that the required information about the dissipation rate
of the rent, which is a phenomenon that arises because of com-
petition in the product market, does not naturally appear in the
arm’s length analysis. That analysis will take account of two fac-
tors of relevance to the calculation of the rent. First, one will look
to the actual costs of labor in the jurisdiction of labor supply.
These are sound third-party prices because they reflect amounts
paid to individual employees. Second, one will have gross income
from sale of the final product in the product market. This is also
a good third-party price. Ignoring other expenses and value cre-
ation from the sales function, the gap between these two factors
should embed a normal return and any amount of rent. The rent
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will disappear over time, as there is downward pressure on gross
income when prices fall. The particular issue faced by an arm’s
length analysis, however, is the compensation of the related
party service provider. The reference price under arm’s length
principles will be other service providers.
Suppose that we have segmented labor markets, with a single
integrated high-cost segment and a single low-cost segment. If
we reference the low-cost segment, as under current approaches,
then the pricing captures none of the rent. If we reference the
high-cost segment, as under this article’s transfer pricing pro-
posal, we then accurately capture all of the rent at the outset,
but the measure will increasingly come to overstate the rent as
product market competition drives prices downward. Put
simply, the problem is that the magnitude of the rent is dynamic
and reflects competitive pressures. But, the seemingly available
reference points to determine compensation for the related party
services company are all static because they reflect market seg-
mentation. The labor markets, of course, may be internally com-
petitive, but those competitive forces will not correctly capture
the dynamics of the rent dissipation. In this way, it should be
acknowledged that each of the current approaches and this arti-
cle’s proposal are clearly second-best options. The current ap-
proach has no mechanism to separate the labor rent from other
elements of profit. Arguably, this produces the correct result
when the labor rent is gone in product market equilibrium. But,
in the dynamic process leading to equilibrium, we have an unde-
sirable result to the extent that the profit from labor rent is re-
flected as residual profit from mobile intangibles and thus faces
little or no tax. The proposal in this article faces something of
the opposite problem. Arguably, it separates and measures the
rent correctly at the beginning of the competitive process but
then begins to overstate systematically the rent as consumer
prices begin to come down.51
51. As an aside, I would observe that formulary apportionment does not
achieve a first-best solution to this problem either. It is true that formulary
apportionment will never “overstate” the labor rent, as my proposal is bound
to do. Because the approach begins by calculating the overall profit of the or-
ganization, such overall profit will always take full account of effects on gross
income from competitive pressures in the product market. But, it fails in two
ways. First, the apportionment factors are not plausibly going to assign the
labor rent portion of the profit to the “correct” jurisdiction, as understood by
the argument presented above. For example, a formula that included any sales
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It is very difficult to assess at a conceptual level the relative
magnitude of the problem under the current approach versus
those encountered under this proposal. To do so would involve
empirical analysis of several important issues. The first is the
nature of the competitive process in the product market. As a
general matter, the more competition in the final product mar-
ket the greater becomes the mismeasurement problem. But,
there is no generally applicable answer to this question across
the universe of taxpayers. Results will vary across sectors and
also within sectors. The second is the degree to which taxpayers
are currently able to treat labor rents as embedded in other val-
uable intangibles and shift associated profit to low tax jurisdic-
tions. As is acknowledged by this article, there is reason to be-
lieve this is a substantial problem, but presently we lack any
quantitative assessment of this effect.
Obviously lacking the empirical measures necessary to make
the required comparisons, consider a few observations. First, it
is worth emphasizing that the current approach to labor rents
under the accepted geographic market criteria is importantly
flawed in ways that seem to be ignored in current treatments.
Second, to the extent that one approaches transfer pricing policy
as a part of the general project of development finance, this
should alter the nature of the comparative question. That is, one
should consider not just the measurement of the rents issue
across the two approaches but rather how this proposal, with the
acknowledged flaws, compares to other available (imperfect)
means of development finance. Finally, it may be possible to ad-
dress some of the measurement issues under this proposal. A few
possibilities will be briefly suggested here, all of which might be
described as achieving a sort of middle ground between the cur-
rent approach and this proposal for a jurisdiction of labor-de-
mand comparables test.
One possibility would be to rely on a range of arm’s length com-
parables derived from both the jurisdiction of labor supply and
factor would allocate some portion of the labor rent to the jurisdiction of ulti-
mate consumption. It is difficult to square that result with the preferred ap-
proach to the taxation of location-specific rents. Second, and related, any ap-
proach that applies apportionment to overall group profit as a single category
will fail to separate out the labor rent from the rest of the base. Necessarily,
then, it will fail to achieve the first-best benchmark defended in this article,
which demands accurate and separate measurement of the labor rent over
time, which is then fully allocated to the jurisdiction of labor supply.
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the jurisdiction of labor demand. On the assumption of seg-
mented labor markets, this range should evidence a low cluster
and a high cluster. The idea would be that the taxpayer would
be required to base arm’s length pricing at some point in the
middle of this distribution. As a splitting of the difference, this
would allow some taxation of the labor rent in the jurisdiction of
labor supply at the outset. The amount would be suboptimally
low to begin with but would reduce error cost, compared to the
basic proposal, in the state of product market equilibrium. A var-
iation of this approach would be to have a discrete shift at some
point from using demand-jurisdiction-based comparables to sup-
ply-jurisdiction-based comparables. This would clearly never
achieve perfection, but if the discrete shift were tailored to infor-
mation about speed of rent dissipation then it would have the
potential to perform better than an approach that simply used a
combined demand-supply jurisdiction range in perpetuity. Even
without particularly detailed information on the rate of dissipa-
tion, it is possible that a discrete shift after, say, one or two tax
years could well perform better than the current approach or my
basic proposal. A further possibility to explore would be to incor-
porate the labor rent explicitly into profit splits. If nothing else,
this article likely has demonstrated the range of problems with
accurately measuring the labor rent as it dissipates. This calls
into dispute the unquestioned fashion in which we tend to see
this as clearly a part of “routine” profit. If one packaged the labor
rents aspect with other nonroutine returns, this would open the
door to allocate this, at least in part, to the jurisdiction of labor
supply. This, of course, just brings the measurement issue back
to the forefront. This will remain a very difficult problem. Ide-
ally, we would like to base the allocation of the profit split on a
factor that tracks diminishing contribution of the labor factor
over time. This will be very difficult in practice, but there is at
least conceptual space for approaching the correct answer in a
way one cannot, if we treat the matter simply as ordinary provi-
sion of labor services with segmented markets.
Finally, taking into account the way in which the discretion of
the jurisdiction to tax allocated labor rents could offer a powerful
answer to the basic measurement problem. At least in the case
where there is a single country that makes up a segmented labor
market, that jurisdiction will have the incentive not to overtax
allocated rents. Suppose rents start off at $x and a controlled
subsidiary is allocated exactly that amount based on the labor
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cost savings. Over time, imagine that the rent is dissipated to
zero but that the jurisdiction of labor supply is still allocated $x
of rent because the labor cost fundamentals across the two seg-
ments of the market have remained the same. At this point, if
the jurisdiction of labor supply seeks to tax a portion of the “rent”
then this should have the effect of driving the labor production
to another jurisdiction, as under the standard tax competition
model. Thus, the jurisdiction should have proper incentives not
to overtax nonexistent rents. This just pushes the informational
problem onto the jurisdiction of labor supply, which may be ill-
equipped to deal with it. On the other hand, it does mean one is
attempting to solve that problem with an additional source of
information—actual firm behavior regarding labor outsourcing.
2. Defining the Labor Demand Market
In the initial description of this article’s basic proposal, the
proposed comparables analysis was described as resting upon
examination of the jurisdiction of labor demand instead of the
jurisdiction of labor supply. One important issue that has not yet
been addressed is that, while the jurisdiction of labor supply will
be readily identifiable, this may well not be the case for the ju-
risdiction of labor demand. In the simple model discussed above,
matters were relatively, though artificially, easy because all fac-
tors pointed to the United States as the jurisdiction of labor de-
mand.52 But, clearly, actual implementation of any such ap-
proach would need to take account of more complex corporate
structures (and the tax planning that might lead to such struc-
tures). For example, if in the simple fact pattern above the U.S.
parent had some intermediate subsidiary in a third jurisdiction
acquire the labor (possibly also in a jurisdiction with low labor
costs), then this should not have the effect of treating such third
state as the jurisdiction of labor demand. Drafting the correct
legal rule will thus involve necessary complexities. This section
will set out the basic conceptual framework that could inform
the drafting of such rules.
It is important to note that the basic measurement issue at
hand regards the labor rent, which in turn is a function of labor
cost savings. Such savings arise in virtue of comparison of labor
cost in the actual jurisdiction of labor supply and the costs ac-
cording to some benchmark. Broadly, there are two possibilities
52. See supra Part I.A.1.
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for assessing that benchmark. Specifically, one could look to al-
ternative own-labor costs or one could look to the labor costs of
competitors. In the case of own-labor costs, one is relying on a
historical benchmark. This would be the preferred test for mar-
ket determination where a firm has previously conducted labor
in a given jurisdiction, prior to terminating such activity and
shifting production to another locale. It would also be the pre-
ferred test where a firm continues to produce some output in a
relatively high-cost jurisdiction and then expands production
into a low-cost jurisdiction. In these sorts of cases, it should be a
relatively straightforward matter to identify the correct jurisdic-
tion of labor demand upon viewing all the facts and circum-
stances. What we seek here is the answer that firm managers
would give to the following question: “If you currently realize la-
bor cost savings because of the location of labor supply, these
savings arise as compared to labor provision in which labor mar-
ket?” (Recall here that this answer need not refer to a single
country but rather only to a single integrated labor market.) It
is plausible that managers would be able to answer this question
without much difficulty. Translating this into a legal rule with
prospective effect, however, will present various drafting chal-
lenges, but it is at least clear what target we are aiming for.
The second conceptual possibility is to look at competitor labor
costs. If the taxpayer is earning labor rents at all, then it must
be the case that competitors are not also operating in the low-
labor cost jurisdiction, or at least not to the same extent. This
provides another way to identify the conceptually correct juris-
diction of labor demand. Specifically, one would have to examine
the final product market (to which the labor inputs relate), iden-
tify competitors in that market, and then finally identify the
high labor cost markets where such firms source labor inputs.
This sort of procedure is clearly more administratively complex
than the first and should be favored only in those cases where
the taxpayer has no current or prior operating history in rela-
tively high-cost labor markets.
B. Tax Competition
A further set of problems one must think about with respect to
this article’s proposal relates to the likely effect of tax competi-
tion. So far, the problem has been analyzed as if there is a single
country that comprises a segmented labor market with low-cost
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labor inputs. It is likely, however, that to some extent these seg-
mented markets will be regional and transcend national bound-
aries. Consider a simple case like the one previously analyzed
but with two jurisdictions of low-cost labor supply that form a
completely integrated labor market (though segmented from the
high-cost labor market). If one were to allocate the labor rent to
the jurisdiction of labor supply in this sort of case, then it would
seem that each of these two jurisdictions might just end up com-
peting down to zero the tax rate on those rents.
Here I would make two observations. First, it is possible that
one faces a middle ground in the real world where there are mul-
tiple segmented labor markets in developing countries, all of
which have cost savings over labor supply in developed coun-
tries. In such a case, the jurisdiction with the lowest labor costs
really reflects a country-specific rent. That jurisdiction should
be able to tax that rent without facing tax competitive pressures
from other jurisdictions.
Second, with respect to rents that are available equally across
jurisdictions of a particular segment of the labor market, we face
a situation of something like a region-specific or segment-spe-
cific rent. Here, we do face a problem of tax competitive pres-
sures driving the rent tax down to zero. This is an unambigu-
ously bad result from an efficiency perspective. This is not like
the standard tax competition case, which can be read as a gen-
eral argument against source-based taxation of capital income.
In the standard case, we are dealing with distortionary taxes
that affect the location of capital and thus are shifted onto local
immobile factors. Where one has a segment-specific rent, how-
ever, it really is a rent. There is a prospect with coordination of
levying non-distortionary rents taxes. That is, there is the pos-
sibility of raising additional revenue without distorting the deci-
sion to locate labor within the region or segment. Although such
coordination will be extremely difficult and infrequently dis-
cussed, its normative appeal is compelling.
CONCLUSION
The discrete transfer pricing proposal advanced in this article
for a labor-demand comparables test will likely meet considera-
ble resistance. It takes an area (perhaps one of the few) where
arm’s length transfer pricing seems to work fairly well and in-
stead invites a substantially more complex measurement exer-
cise (which this article fully admits) that runs the risk of being
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at least partially wrong. The broader source entitlement pro-
posal regarding the scope of source taxation will likewise meet
substantial resistance as a fairly radical departure from the ex-
tant architecture of international double taxation conventions.
Yet, this article has attempted to illustrate that the current
approach, in spite of the appeal of simplicity, is flawed. With its
single-minded focus on organizational neutrality, it systemati-
cally ignores the fact that labor rents, in the presence of general
planning for mobile intangibles, may go largely untaxed.
For the many countries that are capital poor and labor rich,
one of the most valuable national attributes is the ability to offer
low-cost labor inputs. The extraordinary returns available from
such inputs in a world with segmented labor markets are
properly taxed in the developing world for a range of reasons.
The returns may represent the equivalent of return-to-state in-
vestment; the developing countries may be the only ones that
can plausibly tax this non-distorting base (as it will be near im-
possible to break out once comingled with other profit elements,
which we already struggle to tax); and the tax revenues would
seem to be relatively desirable sources of development finance
on the margin.
In summation, such rents should be a prime component of
source-based tax. Doctrinally, such source-based tax can be im-
posed on resident affiliates under the transfer pricing analysis
proposed in the article or on nonresident affiliates under the re-
vised conception of the source entitlement that could be put in
place through altered versions of Articles 5 and 7 of the typical
double taxation convention.
For these reasons, the proposals in this article hopefully will
at least invite a broader and more thorough consideration of the
particular place of labor rents in the interaction between trans-
fer pricing and source-based taxation.
